SudetenGermanGenocideConcepts

Czechoslovak and British Concepts
of a Sudeten German Genocide

Rudolf F Pueschel, PhD

Czech historiography tries to make us believe that the Sudeten German
genocide resulted from a spontaneous reaction of Czech nationals to the
brutality of German occupation between 1939 and 1945 . This is not true.
First of all, there was no significant homeland resistance and atrocities
essentially did not happen until after the assassination of Reich Protector
Heydrich, an act that was organized and executed from abroad. During the
war the Czech population neither offered any considerable resistance nor
practiced any effective sabotage against the German war industry.

On the other hand, documents have been unearthed from the archives that
prove that the expulsions were thoroughly thought out and prepared by
Czech politicians in exile in London during the war, masterminded by Dr.
Edvard Beneš, with other Czech exiles such as Dr. Ladislav Feierabend,
General Sergěj Ingr, Jaromir Nečas and Dr. Hubert Ripka in supporting roles.
Shockingly, those Czech exiles were extensively supported by British
intelligence officials, as the British historian Martin Brown recently revealed
in his book "Dealing with Democrats" . As a result, the British government is
much more implicated in the Sudeten German genocide than a mere
consent to the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia at Potsdam
would suggest .

In 1940, the concept of population transfers was not a new one. Beneš
himself had considered limited transfer of Sudeten Germans in September
1938 in an attempt to appease Hitler ; Greco-Bulgarian and Greco-Turkish
exchanges of populations had been carried out under the auspices of the
League of Nations in the 1920s ; in 1937, the Peel Commission had
proposed exchanges or transfers of Jewish and Arab populations in
Palestine ; the term 'transfer' had appeared in article seven of the Munich
Agreement of 1938 in reference to the transfer of territory and population
from Czechoslovakia to Germany; Nazi Germany had made use of
population transfers of ethnic Germans in Italy and the Baltic States.
Techniques similar to transfers had long been practiced in the British
Empire and now were to reemerge in British strategic thinking. Surely,
Czech and British officials in the 1940s must have been aware of these
exchanges.

Following suit, in a speech to the Royal Society on 22 January 1940 Beneš
raised the possibility of population transfers as a solution to
Czechoslovakia's minority problems . According to Brown (p.273), "he
returned to this theme during conferences held in Oxford on 8 March and 4
April, both organized and sponsored by the Royal Institute of International
Affairs (RIAA), where he proposed undertaking some limited internal and
external transfers of Sudeten Germans, combined with border
rectifications". Simultaneously, ethnic cleansing of Sudeten Germans was
the subject of a research paper produced by the Foreign Research and
Press Service (FRPS), a think tank that was created in late summer 1939 by
the British Foreign Office in response to the developing international crises
as "both a reference library and a source of information on the background
of current problems" (Brown). The FRPS staff included many of the
foremost British experts on European, international, and imperial affairs and,
most significantly, Robert Seton-Watson, a British Slavic scholar and a close
friend and collaborator in anti-Austrian-Hungarian clandestine activities of
the first Czechoslovak president, T.G. Masaryk, before and during World War
I. Both men met for the first time in Rotterdam in 1914 when Masaryk handed
Seton-Watson "a lot of secret information, some of sensational kind" . Seton-
Watson was a member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace
Conference 1919 and was involved in the negotiations over
Czechoslovakia's frontiers and the inclusion of three million ethnic Germans
into that state).

It was under the auspices of FSRP that in May 1940 John David Mabbott, "an
academic political philosopher with some knowledge of minority issues in
eastern Europe" (Brown), completed a memorandum "The Transfer of
Minorities". Brown states: "Crucially, Mabbott's memorandum not only
suggested that 'transfers' were indeed possible, based on evidence from
previous exchanges of populations and supported by Hitler's own opinion
on the subject, but he concluded that it was probably the best solution to
Czechoslovakia's ethnic minority problems. ... Mabbott went on to to set out
a clear framework in which 'transfers' might occur, including an assessment
of the social and financial costs of such an operation. Lastly, and most
importantly, he concluded that such large-scale 'transfer' would have to be
undertaken with international consent and co-operation." According to
Brown, "...Seton-Watson handed a copy of Mabbott's original paper to
Beneš (even though it was clearly marked secret) and several distinct
similarities between it and later plans can be identified. Whilst a direct
correlation between these two documents has yet to be proven, beyond a
reasonable doubt it is very likely that Beneš used Mabbott's paper to
produce a credible policy on 'transfers' that was acceptable to the British
authorities. ... It should, however, be made absolutely clear that the
subsequent evolution of a policy of 'transfers' was driven forward by the
Czechoslovak Government in exile and not by the British Foreign Office".

Interestingly, in the Taborsky files in the archives of the Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University has been located a
typewritten copy of a document with similar content but a different title than
the Mabbott paper. It is entitled "Minority Regimes and the Transfer of
Populations in Central Europe after this War" and is subdivided into the
following sections: Four ways of dealing with minorities; the necessity for a
radical separation of the nationalities in central Europe; the cession of
territory; transfer of populations; conventions regarding transfers and their
content; international participation and assistance; exemption from transfer;
the region of the remaining minorities; and transfer of populations as a
factor in the solution of the great political problems of post-war Europe.
Neither author nor date are specified, but it probably originated in 1942 and,
if needed, the author could possibly be identified from handwriting samples
shown in the margins of this paper.

It possibly was the content of these memoranda that Beneš handed over to
Foreign Commissar Molotov on 14 December 1943 in Moscow during his
visit to sign, against the advice of the British government, a "Pact of
friendship and mutual assistance after the war between the Czechoslovak
Republic and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics" which, as it turned
out later, was a significant leap toward placing post-war Czechoslovakia
under Soviet yoke. Beneš handed his expulsion plans to Molotov as a "first
draft of the fundamental principles of the transfers" which he considered "a
radical solution, the realization of which would make me very happy." He
indicated that he already had discussed the transfer issue with Stalin who
agreed with plans and concept. He described 'his' Germans as the worst
war criminals of them all who deserve the severest punishment. He asked
Molotov to study his transfer plans and to let him know what he thinks of it.

Molotov didn't dare object to Beneš's plans which Stalin already had
approved. Subsequently, on 15 December 1943 Beneš's acting foreign
minister Ripka declared in a report on the Czech-Soviet treaty to the
Czechoslovak State Council: "We can rest assured that Czechoslovakia's
great Soviet ally will grant her all effective support in her endeavor, the aim
of which is that Czechoslovakia should emerge from this war as a strong
state, internally well balanced to the utmost possible extent, and nationally
as homogeneous as possible, having as its basis the indissoluble unity
determined by destiny of Czechs and Slovaks together with the sub-
Carpathian Slavs, who are united with them".

A few days later, on 21 December 1943, Beneš himself said in a message to
the Czech people broadcast from Moscow: "... the Soviet Union sincerely
desires a strong and consolidated Czechoslovak Republic, nationally as
homogeneous as possible, which would be a real good and strong friend
and collaborator with the Soviet peoples in the maintenance of a lasting
European peace." On an other occasion Beneš declared in Moscow: "Our
Republic will be a national State of Czechs, Slovaks and the people of sub-
Carpathia".

In January 1944 the Executive of the Sudeten German Social Democratic
Party under the leadership of Wenzel Jaksch took a stand against Beneš's
expulsion plans . They show that, according to the 1930 census,
Czechoslovakia's 14,729,536 citizens consisted of 10,325,545 Slavs and
4,403,991 non-Slavs, including 3,318,445 Germans and conclude: "Even the
most liberal interpretation of the term 'as homogeneous as possible' would
imply the elimination from the State of millions. Furthermore, as
Czechoslovakia claims her pre-Munich frontiers, this does ... mean (nothing
less than) mass transfer of populations".

The social democratic memorandum then addresses extent and implications
of the planned population transfers: "The full magnitude of the problem
emerges only if it is judged not in isolation but in its wider aspect. Similar
demands have been put forward by the Poles, whose claim to East Prussia
and Silesia is coupled with the demand that these territories should be
cleared of their German inhabitants, who are an overwhelming majority.
Disregarding the question of 'un-mixing the Balkan populations' and other
problems of this kind, which would undoubtedly be raised ... and counting
for the moment only Germans, as many as ten million people are involved in
the plan of 'establishing a more permanent equilibrium' by enforced transfer
of populations.

"It can safely be contended that five years ago, at the outbreak of the war,
suggestions of this kind would have met with unanimous and indignant
repudiation from all progressive quarters. That they are now seriously
presented as a solution of the nationality problem only shows how far
contemporary 'realistic thinking' is removed from the ideological issues of
an anti-Fascist war, how nationalistic and militaristic considerations, in
short: power politics, have again gained the upper hand over the ideals for
which the United Nations still profess to fight.

"The British government have solemnly declared that they will never
consent to mass reprisals against whole populations. The uprooting of
millions, the destruction of their whole social existence - what else would it
mean than mass reprisals? The guilty, the less guilty and the innocent could
never be sorted out in this process. How, then, can it be reconciled with the
declared policy of the British government, or for that matter with the Atlantic
Charter? However, we do not wish to dismiss the problem with this general
rejection on humanitarian grounds, nor do we allow ourselves the cheap
consolation that such plans are impracticable, anyway, and the more so
while fifteen to twenty million displaced people, victims of Hitler's war, are
anxiously waiting for their repatriation. We want to go more fully into the
special Sudeten problem.

"After Munich, the most convincing argument for the Czechs' case was the
crippling of Czechoslovakia's economic life by the loss of valuable, and
indeed indispensable, resources. She lost, above all, most of her export
industries, upon which her economy depended to a large extent. To give
only a few figures, Czechoslovakia lost 95% of her lignite mining, 88% of her
linen industry, 70% of her wool industry, 55% of her cotton industry, 70% of
her glass industry, and 85% of her chinaware industry. Moreover, the
Sudeten industries have been substantially expanded during the war, and
though much of the inflated war industries will become useless after the
war, certain developments, e.g. the increased utilization of electric power
and gas, or the erection of a big plant - one of the largest in Europe - for the
production of synthetic petrol, will remain permanent assets.

"If Czechoslovakia cannot live, or at least not prosper, without these
resources, can she satisfactorily exist without the manpower trained to
operate them? The Sudeten German population in 1930 numbered 683,000
wage earners, the overwhelming majority of whom were employed in
industry. They include a very large proportion of highly skilled workers and
craftsmen - in the glass industry they might be styled artists. Granted, by the
application of ruthless methods they can be expelled, but can they be
replaced? Would not the loss of labor, skill and experience inflict upon
Czechoslovakia an economic disadvantage hardly less serious than the
loss of material resources?

"Secondly, 23.4% of the Sudeten Germans are engaged in agriculture. Most
Sudeten peasants are small holders, gaining a poor living from their stony
soil. Only their innate and tenacious attachment to these inherited holdings
induces them to get any yield at all. Their expulsion and replacement,
provided they can be replaced, would lead to a considerable loss of
agricultural output, and that at a time when every bit of grain will be a
priceless asset."

"It might be argued that Czechoslovakia will have to face economic
disadvantages for the sake of political stability, and that she would have to
get rid of her German population, if it were a source of disturbance. This
argument, however, is not supported by history. The shoe is rather on the
other foot: It was the deep economic crisis of the thirties, saddling the
Sudeten Germans with nearly 500,000 unemployed , that largely contributed
to making the broad masses despair of democracy. Czech-German relations
must not be judged by the stormy events of an exceptional period, but by
the fact that Czechs and Sudeten Germans have lived together for centuries
in the countries of Bohemia and Moravia, which, until the treaty of Versailles
created the Czechoslovak Republic, were parts of the Austro-Hungarian
empire. In independent Czechoslovakia, German democratic parties joined
the governmental majority as early as 1926, and for almost ten years those
Sudeten German parties which stood for collaboration with the Czechs in a
common state represented the preponderance of the Sudeten German
population. The majority gained by Henlein in 1935 (and later, in the
municipal elections, 1938), in a period of deep economic distress, of
lethargic weakness of European democracy, and through the connivance of
Czech reactionaries, did not express the real will of the German population.

"Czech politicians still emphatically deny that Czechoslovakia was, in 1938,
broken up from within. They show thus a realistic evaluation of the
significance of elections held in a state of mass psychosis and mass
terrorization. A state is not, after all, broken up by shouting, flag waving and
casting votes. In September 1938, at the height of international tension,
while all Europe bowed to Hitler's will, his Sudeten agent, Henlein, attempted
a revolt. The vast majority of the Sudeten population remained absolutely
passive, and a few gendarmes sufficed to restore order, although the
prestige of the administration was then at its lowest. When this happened in
face of an all-powerful Nazi-Germany, we have not the slightest doubt that
after the destruction of Nazism a Czechoslovak Republic, built on sound
economic foundations and ruled democratically, in the true spirit of T.G.
Masaryk, would have in the Sudeten Germans a constructive and not a
disruptive element.

"We deny emphatically that such (expulsion) plans are in the true interest of
the Czech people, for whom we feel a great admiration. Our movement has a
fine tradition of (a) common struggle against Nazism with the democratic
masses of Czechoslovakia. Three thousand Sudeten German socialists in
exile are living witnesses to this struggle. Tens of thousands have paid for
their stubborn defense of Czechoslovak democracy with years of
imprisonment, detention in concentration camps, and even death. In the
underground movement the struggle goes on, in spite of the difficult
conditions of underground actions in a country where the workers are
dispersed over thousands of small towns and little villages, where the
young people are sent to their death on the Russian plains, where hundreds
of thousands have been drafted for work into Germany, where the factories
are crowded with alien workers and prisoners of war, and where there is one
Gestapo spy for every ten workers. Still our underground cadres are intact
and maintaining the tradition of 1938. They are prepared to fight for the
military defeat of Germany, but how can they be expected to risk their lives
for the expulsion of their countrymen? We have not abandoned the 1938
tradition. It is being destroyed by plans which are incompatible with the
spirit of 1938. Only by a genuine understanding on a truly democratic basis
can it be restored."

The call to reason by the Sudeten German social democrats remained
unheeded. After World War II had ended, three million Sudeten Germans
were deprived of their civil and human rights, of their possessions and of
their homeland with 240,000 dead. Today, 65 years later, the Sudeten
German national group (Volksgruppe) has been eradicated; decrees and
laws that then were created to legalize the Sudeten German genocide are
still on the books of the Czech and Slovak judicial systems; in 2004 the
Czech parliament unanimously declared them "unimpeachable, unalterable
and unchangeable"; the majority of the Czech and Slovak peoples still
consider the violation of human rights by the inhuman treatment of their
German countrymen right and just; and all across the Czech Republic,
Beneš statues are being erected in honor of the mastermind of the Sudeten
German genocide. And only a very few individuals on planet Earth, mostly
private citizens at that, object to it. ●